n
with stake s
backs several elected validators, say k
, the NPoS election mechanism will split its stakes into pieces s_1
, s_2
, …, s_k
, so that it backs validator i
with stake s_i
. In that case, nominator n
will be rewarded essentially the same as if there were k
nominators in different pools, each backing a single validator i
with stake s_i
.Stash
and Controller
.3 (x - (n / 10 + 1))) / n would be 3 (10 - (100 / 10 + 1)) / 100 = 3 * (10 - (10 + 1)) / 100 = -0.03
which is rounded to 0.min((3 (14 - (100 / 10 + 1))) / 100, 1) 0.07 = min((3 (14 - 11))/100, 1) 0.07 = min(0.09, 1) * 0.07 = 0.6%
3 (x - (n / 10 + 1))) / n will go beyond 1. Hence, min((3 (x - (n / 10 + 1))) / n, 1) * 0.07
will be ceiled to 7%.min(3 * 1 / 100)^2, 1) = 0.0009
, or a 0.09% slash for that validator pool (i.e., all stake held by the validator and its nominators).min((3 * 5 / 100)^2, 1) = 0.0225
, or a 2.25% slash. If 20 validators equivocated, this is a much more serious offence and possibly indicates a coordinated attack on the network, and so the slash would be much greater - min((3 * 20 / 100)^2, 1) = 0.36
, or a 36% slash on all of these validators and their nominators. All slashed validators will also be chilled.0.09 * 2 = 0.18%
slash, but rather a 0.36% slash - 4x as much as the single validator.Payout all
).validator_commission = 40%
, in which case the validator would receive 40 CHER. The remaining 60 CHER would then be split between the validator and their nominators based on the proportion of stake each nominator had. Note that validators can put up their own stake, and for this calculation, their stake acts just as if they were another nominator.Developer -> Extrinsics -> Staking -> Bond
) you can also send rewards to "None", effectively burning them. It is also possible to top-up / withdraw some bonded CHER without having to un-stake all staked CHER.